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Abstract:    
We consider the make-or-buy decision of oligopolistic firms in an industry in which 
final good production requires specialised inputs. Factor price considerations dictate 
that firms acquire the intermediate abroad, by either producing it in a wholly owned 
subsidiary or outsourcing it to a supplier who must make a relationship specific 
investment. Firms’ internationalisation mode depends on cost and strategic 
considerations.  Crucially, asymmetric equilibria emerge, with firms choosing different 
modes of internationalisation, even when they are ex-ante identical.  With ex-ante 
asymmetries, lower cost producers have a stronger incentive to vertically integrate 
(FDI), while higher cost firms are more likely to outsource. 
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1. Introduction 
A deepening of specialisation and of vertical fragmentation of production has led in 
recent decades to increasing volumes of intra-firm trade and to a growing reliance on 
outsourcing both within and across national boundaries (with firms subcontracting 
activities as diverse as final assembly, R&D and after-sales services).1  These trends 
reflect a  growing complexity in the mode of operation decision of firms, in which the 
‘traditional’ make-or-buy choice analysed in early theories of the firm (whether to 
produce intermediates in-house or to outsource them to an upstream supplier) is now 
entwined to an internationalisation dimension (whether to internalise or outsource 
domestically or internationally). 
 In this paper we focus on one particular dimension of the 
internalisation/internationalisation decision and study the trade-off between 
international outsourcing2 and FDI.3   
 The phenomenon of outsourcing has received significant attention in both public 
discourse and academic literature, giving rise to a large body of empirical4 and 
theoretical work.  Despite this, we maintain that there still remain important dimensions 
of this phenomenon that have not been explored. In particular, we contend that in 
concentrated industries (where firms have significant degrees of market power) strategic 
considerations may be crucial in determining the mode of operation decision of firms. 
Hence, we adopt an oligopolistic setup in which strategic behaviour takes centre stage – 
with the immediate implication that the mode of operation choice of one firm affects 
that of its rivals. We argue that a model that recognises the existence of strategic 
considerations in determining the choice of firms’ organisational form can help to shed 
further light on the features that distinguish outsourcing and vertical FDI – given that, as 
                                                 
1  There is ample evidence of an increase in input trade – e.g. Feenstra and Hanson (1996), Campa and 
Glodberg (1997), Hummels et al (2001), Yeats (2001).  The extent to which this is accounted for by intra-
firm trade is more difficult to establish, given the paucity of sufficiently detailed firm-level data, but 
existing studies (e.g. Hanson et al, 2003) suggest that within MNEs intra-firm trade is of significant 
importance.   
2 Following standard terminology, by outsourcing we mean the acquisition of an input or service from 
another firm. Bhagwati et al (2005) use the term in a much more restricted way to mean the acquisition of 
services from unaffiliated foreign firms. 
3 Leahy and Montagna (2007) focus on the effects of competitive pressure on the choice between vertical 
integration and domestic outsourcing. In general, a firm can source its intermediate from another firm or 
make the input itself. In either case, the firm can choose whether to get the intermediate at home or 
abroad. The simultaneous trade-off between all the different possibilities facing the firm can prove rather 
complex.  So, as is common in the literature, we prefer to examine a trade off between two modes of 
operation at a time.  
4 See for instance Abraham and Taylor (1996), Audet (1996), Feenstra (1998), Campa and Goldberg  
(1997) , Hummels et al (2001), and Bartel et al (2005). 
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pointed out by Spencer (2004) – both organisational forms are driven by similar factors, 
such as cost of production and transport costs.  
 There already exists a small literature on outsourcing in oligopoly – see for 
instance, Nickerson and Vanden Bergh (1999) Shy, and Stenbacka (2003) and Chen et 
al (2004). While these papers are important in that they study outsourcing in a strategic 
environment, they ignore an important feature of outsourcing, because they model it as 
a situation in which downstream firms buy generic inputs from upstream firms. 
However, outsourcing is not restricted to the purchase of standardised inputs and raw 
materials but typically involves asset specificity, investment in customisation and 
contract incompleteness. These features of outsourcing, in a tradition that dates back to 
Coase (1937), Williamson (1975, 1985) and Grossman and Hart (1986), are instead at 
the core of the dominant framework proposed in recent years by Grossman, Helpman 
and Antràs (henceforth GHA) who, in a number of influential papers, have produced a 
series of monopolistically competitive general equilibrium models in which outsourcing 
involves forming a bilateral relationship with a partner firm that makes relationship 
specific investments so that it can produce a high quality customised input.5  Following 
Leahy and Montagna (2007), in this paper we apply this approach in an oligopoly 
setting in which firms choose their mode of operation strategically.6   
 At the cost of abstracting from the general equilibrium feature of the GHA 
framework, our approach allows for a richer characterisation of the complex 
interdependence between the internal organisation of the firm and the strategic 
environment within which it operates. 
 A key result of the paper is the emergence of asymmetric equilibria, with firms 
choosing different modes of internationalisation even when they are ex-ante identical.  
This result is consistent with existing stylised facts whereby firms within the same 
industry adopt different mode of operation strategies, and differs fundamentally from 
that obtaining in the monopolistic competition literature á la GHA (where different 
behaviours can only emerge from ex-ante asymmetries between firms).  Consistent with 
existing empirical work, we then find that when firms are ex-ante asymmetric lower 
cost producers have a stronger incentive to vertically integrate via FDI than higher cost 
competitors, which are more likely to outsource. 
                                                 
5 See for instance Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2003 and 2005) and Antràs, and  Helpman (2004). 
6 Until Leahy and Montagna (2007), the GHA approach had not been applied to oligopoly.    
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 The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. The 
game is solved in Section 3 and the equilibrium regimes are discussed in Section 4. 
Section 5 considers the implications of relaxing some of the basic model’s assumptions 
and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  The Model 
We consider a market in which there are two ex ante identical final goods firms that are 
located in the North and sell a homogenous good to an integrated market.  We assume 
that this final goods market is also located in the North and thus that sales do not 
involve a transport cost.7  The inverse demand is given by: 
 )( 21 yyap +−= , (1)  
where p is the price of the good, a is a constant parameter, and 1y  and 2y  are the 
quantities produced by firms 1 and 2 respectively.  
We assume that the production of the final good requires a specialised 
component, which is combined in fixed proportions with other inputs.  One unit of this 
intermediate is required per unit of output. The firms must also use some other inputs to 
produce the good. We model these as a composite input and normalise its price at unity. 
Let 0>−= ii zee  be firm i’s per-unit input requirement for the composite input, where 
iz  captures the ‘usefulness’ of the intermediate and e  is a constant. A more useful 
intermediate is one that requires to be combined with fewer other inputs in order to 
produce a unit of output. 
We assume that due to factor price considerations it is too costly to produce or 
procure the intermediate in the North. Instead, the intermediate must be produced in the 
South.  Hence we abstract from the location dimension of the sourcing decision of the 
firm and assume that, as in Grossman and Helpman (2003), the firm can either produce 
the intermediate in a subsidiary (FDI option) or purchase it from a specialised southern 
supplier (outsourcing option).    
If the firm does FDI and so sets up a fully owned subsidiary in the South, then 
the input can be produced there at a marginal cost of r . On the other hand, if the firm’s 
                                                 
7 This assumption may reflect the fact that the destination market is in the home country of the firms, 
and/or that it is highly integrated – perhaps in a customs union – with the market where the firms are 
located.  Alternatively, we could assume that transport costs of serving the market are identical for the 
two firms and could thus be ignored. It is easy to show that allowing for a symmetric transport cost would 
not change the results qualitatively.  
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specialized component is outsourced then its price is iq .  In either event, to deliver this 
input to the home country where it is combined with the composite input, the firm must 
pay a transport cost of t per unit of intermediate.8   If the firm chooses to carry out FDI, 
then it must pay a fixed cost F upfront. This includes both the standard fixed costs of 
setting up and operating a plant at arms length in the foreign country and the corporate 
governance cost of running an internationally vertically integrated firm. Since it is 
plausible to assume that the fixed costs of operating abroad are lower under outsourcing 
– there are no plant costs, for instance – and the governance costs under outsourcing are 
lower than those under vertical integrated FDI, we can normalise final goods firms fixed 
costs under outsourcing at zero. 
 The ‘usefulness’ of the intermediate to the final producer depends on the level of 
the investment in its quality and in customisation. We will assume that Kz = , where 
K is investment in quality and customisation. Thus, there are diminishing returns to 
investment. This is a plausible assumption and one that is needed to ensure an interior 
solution.  Using the superscripts I and O to denote FDI and outsourcing respectively, 
marginal production cost for firm i will thus be:  
 tzeqc ii
O
i +−+= , (2a)  
if the firm outsources its intermediate, and  
 tzerc i
I
i +−+= ,  (2b) 
if it produces it in a wholly owned subsidiary.   
 If firm i does FDI, its profit function is given by:  
 FKycp ii
I
i
I
i −−−= )(π , (3) 
where F represents the fixed cost of setting up a plant in the South plus the fixed 
governance cost that an internationally vertically integrated firm is assumed to incur. On 
the other hand, if the firm chooses to outsource, its profit function will instead be: 
 i
O
i
O
i ycp )( −=π . (4)  
                                                 
8 In the event of outsourcing we assume that it is the downstream firm that pays the transport cost. Note 
that the results would not be materially changed were we to assume, instead, that it is the upstream firm 
that pays the transport cost.   
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When a firm chooses to outsource, it avoids both the investment costs and the other 
fixed costs of FDI. The investment costs are now borne by an intermediate goods 
producer who has profits:  
 EKmrq ii
m
ii −−−= )(μ , (5) 
where E  is a fixed entry cost and mr  represents the upstream producer’s marginal 
production cost. We assume that the marginal production cost of the intermediate can 
differ depending on whether it is produced in-house under FDI (r), or by an upstream 
firm under outsourcing ( mr ).  Since one unit of the intermediate is needed in the 
production of each unit of final output, we can write ii ym = .  Note that we will also use 
i to represent the southern upstream firm that has a bilateral outsourcing relationship 
with the northern downstream firm i.  
 
3.  The Game   
The model is a four-stage game.  In stage one, firms decide whether to outsource their 
intermediate or to do FDI.  If they decide to outsource, they approach a specialised 
supplier firm, located in the South, which will produce the intermediate.  International 
vertical integration entails instead the set-up of a wholly owned subsidiary in the South 
to manufacture the intermediate. In stage two, the firms invest in the development of the 
intermediate.  If a downstream firm opts for outsourcing, then the specialised supplier 
firm undertakes the investment.  In stage three, the firms (if they outsource) bargain 
with their intermediate supplier over the price of the intermediate.9  As in Grossman and 
Helpman (2003), we assume that the final good producer only has enough time to 
negotiate with a single supplier and furthermore, should bargaining break down, the 
producer will not have sufficient time to produce the intermediate itself, and so will exit 
the market – while the supplier will have wasted its investment.  In stage four, at a 
                                                 
9 We assume that the relationship between upstream and downstream firms is a bilateral one. We ignore 
the possibility that a large upstream supplier could force the two downstream firms to compete for its 
output. There are a number of ways in which this possibility can be ruled out. Perhaps, the simplest way 
is to assume that the firms choose to outsource the specialized component in different geographical 
locations in the South. Another possibility is that, as a result of customization, the intermediates used by 
downstream firms are sufficiently different from each other.  We also rule out the possibility that more 
than one upstream firm compete to supply the downstream firm. One could think of there being ex-ante 
many identical potential intermediate suppliers.  However, given that there is only one downstream firm 
in a particular location, only one firm will enter to supply it in equilibrium since with more than one 
upstream firms, as a result of Bertrand competition between firms, the intermediate price would be driven 
to the marginal production cost and the firms will be unable to cover their investment and fixed entry 
cost. Anticipating this, only one firm will enter to supply a downstream firm.   
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transport cost of t, the intermediate is shipped to the North where the downstream firm 
combines it with the other inputs to produce the final output. 
 We are interested in Subgame Perfect Nash equilibria and so, as usual, we begin 
by solving the final stage and then working backwards.  
3.1  Stage 4 
In the final stage of the game, firms choose their output level.  The first-order conditions 
are given by: 
 0=−−=
∂
∂
i
h
i
i
i ycp
y
π , (6) 
where (h=O,I) and (i=1,2). 
 We now combine equation (1) with these first order conditions and then solve to 
obtain the (final-stage) Nash equilibrium in quantities: 
 
3
2 kj
h
i
i
cca
y
+−
= ,                       (7) 
where  (h,k=O,I) and (i,j=1,2) with (i≠j).  
 
3.2  Stage 3 
Stage three of the game is the bargaining stage in which each of the final goods firms 
bargains with an upstream supplier over the price of its intermediate.10  This stage will 
only exist if at least one firm chooses to outsource production of its intermediate input. 
When both firms outsource, the upstream and downstream pairs bargain simultaneously.  
Recall that all fixed and investment costs are sunk at this stage. Then, the price qi of the 
intermediate good results from the maximisation of the following Nash bargain:11 
 [ ][ ]imiiOii yrqycpN )()( −−= , (8) 
                                                 
10 In some models, the purchase of intermediate components is assumed to involve the combination of a 
fixed lump-sum payment and a price set at marginal cost.  However, Spencer (2005) argues that it is 
important to recognize that outsourcing contracts typically involve a strictly positive price that exceeds 
marginal cost, whereas internal transactions within vertically integrated firms do not. She goes on to 
conjecture that  the use of a price mark-up to compensate for relationship-specific investment would  have 
implications for the level of investment and final-good output.  Our paper recognizes this difference 
between outsourcing and FDI and we show that this has implications for the level of investment under the 
competing modes of operation.  
11  We assume that firms have equal bargaining power. Hence the profits of the upstream and downstream 
firm receive the same weights in the bargaining function. Allowing for different weights is 
straightforward but complicates the algebra without giving much additional insight. Leahy and Montagna 
(2007) allow for different bargaining powers. 
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where we have used mi = yi  to eliminate mi.  Make use of (6), the final stage first-order 
condition, to write: 3)( i
m
ii yrqN −= .  Maximising this with respect to qi yields: 
 0)(32 =⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂
−+=
∂
∂
i
im
iii
i
i
q
yrqyy
q
N . (9) 
From (7) and (2a) we obtain: 3/2/ −=∂∂ ii qy .  Combining this with (9), yields the price 
of the intermediate: 
 2/i
m
i yrq += . (10) 
The equilibrium intermediate mark-up, mi rq − , is thus proportional to the final output 
of the downstream firm.  Since r is not necessarily equal to mr , although iq  must be 
larger than mr , it need not be higher than r .   
 
3.3  Stage 2 
The firms choose their investment levels simultaneously in stage 2. If the intermediate is 
produced in a subsidiary abroad then Ki is chosen to maximise FKy ii
I
i −−=
2π , where  
)( Iicp −  has been eliminated using (6). As the FDI and corporate governance costs, F, 
have already been sunk before the firms invest in the intermediate, they play no part in 
the optimal choice of investment levels. The fact that ii Kz =  enables us to model the 
firm as choosing the level of cost reduction: zi, which proves to be analytically 
convenient.  The resulting first-order condition is: 
 02 =⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
− i
i
i
i zdz
dyy , (11) 
which implies: 
i
i
i
I
i
I
i dz
dyyKz == .  As it will become clearer, it is useful to write this 
as:   
 i
IkI
i
I
i yKz θ==   where k=(I,O). (12) 
Note that we adopt the convention that, when there are two superscripts, the first refers 
to firm i and the second to firm j.  The parameter Ikθ  is equal to ii dzdy /  given that firm 
i does FDI and given the mode of operation (k=I,O) of the other firm. It takes on a 
different value depending on the mode of operation of the rival firm. When the rival is 
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vertically integrated via FDI, a firm’s choice of investment only affects its own 
equilibrium output, yi, through changes in its own costs, ci. However, if the rival 
chooses outsourcing, then own investment also affects the bargained price of the rival’s 
intermediate good, qj.  Higher investment, by reducing the rival firm’s output, tends to 
reduce the mark-up enjoyed by the upstream firm – making the downstream firm more 
competitive. This works to reduce the size of ii
Ik dzdy /=θ from 2/3, in the case in 
which the rival does FDI, to 15/24 when the rival outsources (see the appendix for an 
explanation of how this happens). Thus:  
 
3
2   with   == IIIIi
IIII
i yz θθ , (13a) 
and 
 
24
15   with   == IOIOi
IOIO
i yz θθ , (13b) 
where the first superscript refers to firm i and the second to firm j.  A comparison of the 
investment-to-output ratios in (13a) and (13b) reveals that: IOII θθ > and so firm i’s 
investment-to-output ratio is lower when its rival outsources its intermediate than when 
it chooses to produce it in a foreign subsidiary. Thus, outsourcing by one firm ‘softens’ 
the behaviour of its rival, i.e. it reduces its aggressiveness in investment. This results in 
a ‘strategic motive’ to outsource which is discussed in more detail in Leahy and 
Montagna (2007).  
 If the intermediate is outsourced, then zi is chosen by the upstream firm to 
maximise ii Ky −2/
2 , where we have made use of the fact that, from (10),  
2/)( i
m
i yrq =− . This yields the expression for investment 
i
i
i
O
i
O
i dz
dyyKz
2
1
== , 
which is obviously similar to that in which firm i is vertically integrated via FDI: it 
differs only in that the right-hand side is now multiplied by ½.  This difference reflects 
the fact that, although it incurs its cost, the upstream firm only appropriates a share of 
the marginal benefits from investment – and this reduces its incentive to invest in 
quality and customisation. Converting the expression into the same notational form as in 
(12) we get:   
 i
OkO
i
O
i yKz θ== ,   where k=(I,O). (14) 
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Once again, the θ  parameter takes on a different value depending on the mode of 
operation of the rival firm. Again, the reason for the difference lies in the fact that an 
increase in firm’s investment only exerts a downward effect on its rival’s intermediate 
price when the rival is outsourcing. This reduces the incentive for a firm to invest when 
the rival outsources its intermediate.   
 The expression for the investment level under outsourcing when the rival does 
FDI is: 
 
4
1   with   == OIOIi
OIOI
i yz θθ . (15a) 
The corresponding expression for investment under outsourcing when the rival pair are 
also in an outsourcing relationship is: 
 
21
5   with   == OOOOi
OOOO
i yz θθ . (15b) 
Again, outsourcing by one firm ‘softens’ the behaviour of its rival since OOOI θθ >  – a   
firm’s investment-to-output ratio is lower when its rival outsources its intermediate than 
when it chooses to do FDI. 
3.4  Stage 1  
In the first stage of the game, firms choose their mode of operation.  To establish 
whether a firm will outsource or choose to be vertically integrated internationally (FDI), 
we must compare its profits under the two regimes for a given behaviour of its rival. To 
this end, it proves useful to obtain an expression for the profits in terms of outputs and 
parameters only. By using the first-order conditions in (7), we can rewrite the profit 
functions as: 
 
 [ ] Fy IkIkiIki −−= 22 )(1)( θπ , (16) 
and 
 2)( Oki
Ok
i y=π  , (17) 
where k=(I,O).   It is immediately obvious from (16) and (17) that a sufficient condition 
for Iki
Ok
i ππ >   is that
Ik
i
Ok
i yy ≥ .  The term in square bracket is less than unity and so, if 
outsourcing results in an increase in output (perhaps because the marginal cost of 
producing the intermediate is so much cheaper if it is carried out by a specialised 
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upstream producer), then it trivially dominates FDI. However, as we show in the 
Appendix, if firms are ex-ante symmetric and if the upstream supplier has no production 
cost advantage in the intermediate, then a firm’s output is always higher under FDI than 
under outsourcing regardless of the mode of operation choice of the rival. There are two 
reasons for this. First, the level of investment in quality and customisation is lower 
under outsourcing due to the reduced incentive to invest experienced by the upstream 
firm. This implies that the Northern firm takes delivery of a poorer intermediate input 
and, as a consequence, must use more of the other inputs in the production of the final 
good. The second reason is that the upstream supplier must receive a positive mark-up 
over marginal production costs in order to enter and make any investment in the quality 
of the intermediate. Hence, choosing to outsource saves a Northern firm fixed plant and 
governance costs, but leads it to facing higher marginal production costs and 
consequently having a smaller market share.       
 
4.  The Mode of Operation Equilibria  
We turn now to a discussion of the mode of operation equilibria.  Clearly, there are four 
possible candidate equilibrium regimes: (II), (IO), (OI), and (OO), where the first letter 
refers to the mode of operation selected by firm 1 and the second letter refers to the 
mode chosen by the second firm.   
 The downstream firms are ex-ante identical, which means that neither firm has an 
underlying cost advantage. The upstream firms are also ex-ante identical to each other.12 
However, as we will show below, ex-ante identical firms do not always choose the same 
mode of operation; in this instance, as we have argued, they will not invest the same 
amount and will therefore end up with different costs in equilibrium.   
 To begin with, we assume that there is no underlying cost advantage or 
disadvantage from outsourcing – by which we mean that the marginal production cost 
of the input is the same regardless of whether it is made in the wholly owned subsidiary 
or by the upstream foreign supplier. In this instance, the pattern of equilibria depends on 
the level of FDI/governance cost, F.  If F is sufficiently large, then both firms will 
choose to outsource. It can be shown (see Appendix) that at F=0 both firms choosing 
FDI (II) is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium. As shown in the Appendix there is 
                                                 
12 Leahy and Montagna (2007) consider the implications of ex-ante firm asymmetry for the mode of 
operation decision of firms. In that paper, firms from different countries choose between vertical 
intergration and outsourcing locally. They show that the most efficient firms will tend to choose vertical 
integration. 
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multiple asymmetric equilibria (IO) and (OI) for intermediate levels of F.  Hence, for a 
range of F there are asymmetric outcomes despite the fact that the firms are fully 
symmetric ex ante.   
 The underlying reason for the emergence of asymmetric equilibria is that there is a 
negative interdependence between the firm’s mode of operation decisions. The relative 
incentive to choose FDI is larger the larger is one’s expected output. Given ex-ante 
symmetry between downstream firms, FDI is a lower marginal cost (in exchange for 
higher fixed cost) and hence a higher output strategy.  A firm that faces a rival which is 
doing FDI has, ceteris paribus, a lower anticipated market share and hence a lower 
incentive to do FDI itself than a firm that faces an outsourced rival. Hence, over a range 
of F, FDI is a best response to a rival’s outsourcing but outsourcing is a best response to 
a rival’s FDI.  
 
4.1 Trade liberalisation 
Trade liberalisation increases the profitability of using the foreign location to produce 
the intermediate irrespective of whether the firm uses the insourcing (FDI) or the 
outsourcing option. How does trade liberalisation affect the pattern of mode of 
operation equilibria? The first thing to note is that it has no effect on the qualitative 
ranking of equilibria with respect to the FDI costs, F. It remains the case that at low F 
we have (II), at higher F we have (IO) and (OI), and at higher still values of F we have 
(OO). However, trade liberalisation reduces the amount of outsourcing relative to FDI. 
There are two main reasons for this. First, in exchange for facing higher fixed costs, the 
firms that choose FDI have a higher scale of output than those that outsource. This 
means that any fall in per unit trade costs applies to a larger output level under FDI and 
hence is more beneficial to firms choosing the FDI option. Second, trade liberalisation 
raises a firm’s rents but this increases the possibility for rent extraction by the upstream 
firm under outsourcing. A fall in t leads to an increase in the bargained intermediate 
price and this reduces some of the benefit of trade liberalisation for the downstream 
firm.  
 The effect of trade liberalisation on the mode of operation outcomes is illustrated 
in Figure 1. 
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5.  Robustness to asymmetries  
So far we have assumed that the there are no differences in the underlying cost of 
producing the intermediate via FDI or via outsourcing, and that Northern firms are ex 
ante symmetric.  Despite the ex-ante symmetry, we found that outcomes are often 
highly asymmetric in terms of mode of operation, investments and outputs. It is 
interesting, however, to examine the effects of underlying differences in firms for the 
propensity to outsource. Thus, we shall now consider the robustness of the results when 
allowing for the possibility of: (i) asymmetries between upstream and downstream firms 
(in the underlying costs of producing the intermediate), and (ii) between downstream 
firms (first, in the timing of the mode of operation choice and then in their underlying 
production costs).  
 
5.1 Upstream-downstream differences in the cost of producing the intermediate   
It is plausible to assume that, for instance due to technological reasons, the cost of 
producing the intermediate in a foreign subsidiary may differ from that incurred by a 
foreign supplier. We capture cost differences between outsourcing and FDI with the 
parameter: mrr −=ρ , which is the discrepancy between the marginal production cost of 
the intermediate within the firm under FDI and that incurred by the upstream firm. One 
plausible possibility is that ρ is negative. This would be the case if the Northern firm 
were to enjoy a technological advantage over the Southern firm. On the other hand, if 
the Southern firm had developed some additional expertise in producing this sort of 
intermediate, perhaps as a result of accumulated learning, then mrr −=ρ  would be 
likely to be positive.     The effects of changes in ρ  are illustrated in Figure 2 in which 
we show the different outcomes in F and ρ  space.  We see that the ranking of regimes13 
– (II) at low F, followed by the multiple equilibria region (IO) and (OI) for 
intermediate levels of F, and (OO) for high enough F – is unchanged. However, 
unsurprisingly, the regions in which FDI occurs as part of a subgame-perfect 
equilibrium get smaller in ρ  and eventually disappear with the (II) region disappearing 
first (as ρ increases), followed by the multiple asymmetric equilibrium region with (IO) 
and (OI).  
 
                                                 
13 Clearly, the ranking of regimes in the figure is the same on either side of the vertical axis.  
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5.2  Ex-ante asymmetry between northern firms 
So far we have assumed that the Northern firms are ex ante symmetric and shown that, 
despite this, the outcomes are not always symmetric, with equilibria emerging in which 
firms choose different modes of internationalisation.   
 We shall now examine the implications of two different types of ex-ante 
asymmetry. First, we study the effects of an underlying cost asymmetry between 
Northern firms. For ease of exposition, in this subsection we will restrict attention to the 
situation in which the parameter: mrr −=ρ , the gap between the marginal production 
cost of producing the intermediate under FDI and that incurred by the upstream firm 
under outsourcing, is zero throughout. Then, we consider a situation in which the firms 
choose their mode of operation sequentially rather than simultaneously. 
 
5.2.1   Cost asymmetry – Outsourcing as the “poor man’s” foreign investment. 
Suppose firm 1 has an underlying cost advantage in producing the final good. An easy 
way to capture this is to assume that there is a difference in the pre-investment input 
requirements of the firms.14  We will allow e  to take firm specific values, 1e  and 2e , 
with 21 ee < , and define 012 >−≡ eeφ as the underlying efficiency advantage of firm 1.  
We find that the higher cost firms are more likely to choose to outsource. This is 
illustrated in Figure 3 where we allow φ to increase. As φ  increases, the cost advantage 
of firm 1 over firm 2 gets larger. What we see is that the region of (IO) in which the 
first firm is vertically integrated while the, now higher cost, second firm outsources gets 
larger in φ. These results are consistent with those obtained by Antrás and Helpman 
(2004) and support existing empirical evidence that suggests that foreign outsources 
tend to be less productive than firms that invest abroad (e.g. Tomiura, 2007). 
 
5.2.1  The mode of operation is chosen sequentially. 
Firms might not always choose their mode of operation at exactly the same time.  If 
they do not, then a firm that decides early will often be able to exploit this advantage to 
ensure it has higher profits than its rival.  Without loss of generality, we assume that 
firm 1 chooses its mode of operation before firm 2. The remaining stages of the game 
are as before and there is no other ex-ante asymmetry between the firms. We find that at 
                                                 
14 This is not the only possible source of cost asymmetry. Others would be differences in production costs 
of the intermediate or in investment costs. These alternative sources of asymmetry would have very 
similar qualitative implications. 
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low levels of F, both the leader and the follower do FDI. At intermediate levels of F, the 
best reply to FDI is outsourcing. In this region of F, there is a first-mover advantage and 
the leader commits to do FDI before the follower chooses its mode of operation. As a 
result, the leader enjoys higher profits than the follower. As shown in Figure 4, the 
profits of the leader firm jump upwards in F when the follower switches to outsourcing. 
This is because outsourcing is a less aggressive mode of operation choice that results in 
lower investment and output. At high levels of F, the leader also switches to outsourcing 
and this leads to an upward jump in the profits of the follower in F. Hence, allowing for 
the possibility that firms choose their mode of operation sequentially does not alter the 
basic result of the paper.  
 
6.  Conclusions 
We have studied the internalisation/internationalisation decision of firms, within a 
framework that allows for strategic considerations to play a role in determining the 
organisational mode of firms.  We focussed on one particular dimension, namely the 
trade-off between international outsourcing and FDI. Both FDI and international 
outsourcing are affected in a similar manner by factors such as trade liberalisation and 
international differences in input costs, and changes in these tend to affect the profits of 
all firms within an industry in the same direction. Nevertheless, similar firms within an 
industry often choose very different modes of operation.  
 With a model in which outsourcing involves relationship specific investment in 
customisation and contract incompleteness, we showed that strategic considerations can 
give rise to asymmetric equilibria, in which firms choose different modes of 
internationalisation, even when they are ex-ante identical.  We found that a shock 
experienced in common by all firms within an industry can have a qualitatively different 
effect on the returns from different organisational modes. In particular, we showed that 
trade liberalisation reduces the incentive to outsource relative to doing FDI. The 
emergence of asymmetric equilibria helps to shed light on existing stylised facts 
whereby firms within the same industry adopt different organisational modes. This 
stylised fact is not explainable from within the standard monopolistic competition 
literature that of necessity abstracts from strategic considerations.    
 Although the main results of the paper were derived in a model in which firms are 
symmetric, we have also shown that they are robust to the introduction of various types 
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of asymmetry across firms, such as allowing for different underlying costs of producing 
the intermediate under FDI and outsourcing, or allowing for a sequential choice in the 
mode of operation by firms. Interestingly, when allowing for ex-ante asymmetries 
between firms, the asymmetric equilibria are characterised by FDI being the likely 
mode of operation strategy chosen by relatively low cost producers, with outsourcing 
(‘the poor man’s FDI’) being chosen by relatively  high cost firms.   
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Appendix 
 
The parameter θ  in the different regimes 
The parameter θ  takes on a different value depending on the mode of operation of the 
firm and its rival. When firm i does FDI, then ii dzdy /=θ  (see equation (12)) – but 
when the firm outsources then ii dzdy /)( 21=θ  (see equation (14)). To obtain an 
expression for ii dzdy /  differentiate (7) to get:        
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So, it is easy to see that 3/2=IIθ .  
To find IOθ  one can first write: 
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from which can obtain: 
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. Substitution into the expression for IOθ  finally 
yields: 24/15=IOθ .  
To find OIθ , one can first note that: 
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which, when simplified, gives: 
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 and therefore: 4/1=OIθ . 
Finally, the most complicated case is that of  OOθ  which can be written as 
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two equations, it is straightforward to obtain: 
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Reduced form outputs and profits in the different regimes 
The first order condition for investment in equation (12) and (14) can be written in 
compact form as:   
hk
i
hkhk
i yz θ= ,   (A1) 
where the first superscript refers to the mode of operation of firm i and the second refers 
to the mode of operation of its rival.   
The first order condition for output in (6) can be combined with (2a) or (2b) as 
appropriate, (A1), and (when the firm outsources) the expression for the price of the 
intermediate in (10) to obtain the following expression for firm i:  
02 =+−− i
hk
ji
h yyyA η  where h=(I,O), (A2) 
where treaAI −−−=  and treaA mO −−−=  only depend on the firm’s own mode of 
operation,  and 
2
1
−=
OkOk θη  and IkIk θη =  (where the first superscript refers to the 
mode of operation h=(I,O) of firm i and the second superscript k=(I,O) refers to that of 
the rival firm).   Using mIO rrAA −=−=ρ  to represent the pre-investment cost saving 
from outsourcing, we can write: ρ+= IO AA . 
Directly from the two equations in (A2), we can obtain reduced form equilibrium output 
expressions for the two firms. When firm i chooses mode of operation h (h=I,O) and its 
rival chooses mode of operation k (k=I,O),    
khhkkhhk
khkh
hk
i
AAy
ηηηη
η
++−
−−
=
)(23
)2( . (A3) 
Finally, to obtain reduced form expressions for profits in the different regimes we 
simply substitute from (A3) into (16) when firm i is choosing FDI and into (17) when it 
is outsourcing. 
Equilibria in the fully symmetric case 
Assuming that the firms are ex-ante symmetric and there is no underlying cost 
advantage from outsourcing, then at F=0 both firms doing FDI (II) is the unique 
subgame perfect equilibrium.  At F=0 this requires that:  
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2 2 2( ) 1 ( ) ( )    Ik Ik Oky yθ⎡ ⎤− >⎣ ⎦   for k=(I,O). (A4) 
Taking the square root of both sides and making use of the reduced form expressions for 
output, this condition becomes: 
21 ( ) (1 ) (1 )    0  
3 2( ) 3 2( )
Ik kI kO
Ik kI Ik kI Ok kO Ok kO
A Aθ η η
η η η η η η η η
− − −
− >
− + + − + +
,  for k=(I,O), (A5) 
where AAA OI ==  as 0=ρ . Tedious but straightforward calculations show that the 
condition in (A5) holds. 
At intermediate levels of F there are multiple asymmetric equilibria (IO) and (OI). To 
see this, first note that straightforward calculations show that in the base case the 
difference in (A5) is strictly larger when the rival firm outsources. At any given F, the 
gain in profit from FDI relative to outsourcing is larger when the rival is outsourcing.  
Hence, there exists a non empty set of F such that: 
[ ] [ ] 0)()(1)(   )()(1)( 222222 ≥−−>>−− OIIIIIOOIOIO yyFyy θθ . 
For levels of F within this range, a firm will find it more profitable to do FDI if its rival 
is outsourcing, but more profitable to be outsourcing if its rival does FDI.  Hence, there 
are multiple asymmetric equilibria (IO) and (OI).  
Clearly, for 2 2 2( ) 1 ( ) ( )IO IO OOF y yθ⎡ ⎤> − −⎣ ⎦ , firms will always wish to outsource; hence 
(OO) is the unique equilibrium. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II OI
i iπ π=  
IO OO
i iπ π=  F
ρ 
II OI
i iπ π=  
IO OO
i iπ π=  
t 
F 
Figure 1.  Effects of trade liberalisation  
II 
IO, OI 
OO 
II 
IO,  
OI 
OO 
Figure 2.    Upstream-downstream differences in the cost of producing the 
intermediate component  (at φ=0) 
OO 
IO,  
OI 
II 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 1
II OIπ π=  
1 1
IO OOπ π=  
2 2
OI OOπ π=  
2 2
II OIπ π=  
OO 
OO 
IO 
IO 
IO, OI 
IO 
II 
 φ
F 
Figure 3.   Ex-ante asymmetry between northern firms (at ρ1=ρ2=0) 
Figure 4.  The mode of operation is chosen sequentially 
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